Aeronautics and Aerospace are areas rich in dependability requirements for aviation safety and security of software-intensive critical systems. Incidents and software-related failures in such systems challenge trust assumptions and demand verifiable levels of assurance. Our research in this domain has investigated existing systems failures, supported the development of new dependable systems, and continues to investigate analysis techniques for analysing and reasoning about such systems and failures. We have:

• Analysed the failures such as Ariane 5 to learn lessons for better and systematic analysis methods in software engineering.
• Developed a tool-supported OpenArgue approach to elicit, represent, and reason about those facts that mitigate or undercut the claims of the security arguments.
• Established a security requirements ontology which has been applied to air traffic management of an FP7 Single European Sky with Rome Airport (SecureChange), which predates the regulations.
• Articulated new aviation safety requirements for tracking and verifying the motions of all aircraft globally in the era of Internet of Things.